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CONTRACTS
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF WHOLESALER; DOES IT RUN FROM
WHOLESALER TO CONSUMER?
Texas. In the recent case of Bowman Biscuit Company v. Hines1
the court made great strides in bringing to the law of implied
warranty on packaged goods a more definite basis than has here-
tofore existed in Texas. A. C. Hines sued the Bowman Biscuit
Company for injuries sustained by Hines when he swallowed a
wire contained in an Apricot-Puff cookie. The cookie was con-
tained in a sealed package purchased from a retail grocer who had
purchased it from the defendant as a wholesaler. The court of civil
appeals certified the following question to the supreme court:
Where the ultimate consumer of food, sold in the original sealed
package for human consumption, suffers injury and damage from
such food being contaminated, is the wholesaler, or middleman, as
well as the manufacturer and retailer, liable to such ultimate consumer
for damages proximately resulting to him by reason of the eating of
such food, under an implied warranty imposed by law as a matter
of public policy? 2
On the original hearing the supreme court answered the ques-
tion "Yes" in a five-to-four decision. This decision was based on
Griggs Canning Company v. Iosey' and Decker & Sons Inc. v.
Capps." In the Capps case a non-negligent manufacturer sold con-
taminated sausage, and, as a result of eating this sausage, the
plaintiff's son died. In holding the manufacturer liable the Texas
Supreme Court said, "Liability in such a case is not based on
negligence nor on a breach of the usual implied contractual war-
ranty but on the broad principle of the public policy to protect
human health and life."5 In the losey case a non-negligent retailer
sold a labeled contaminated can of spinach causing the illness of
1 _._Tex.-, 251 S.W. 2d 153 (1952).
2 Id. at 154.
3 139 Tex. 623, 164 S. W. 2d 835 (1942), noted, 142 A.L.R. 1424 (1943).
4 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W. 2d 828 (1942), noted, 142 A.L.R. 1479 (1943).5 Id. at 612, 164 S.W. 2d at 829.
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the plaintiff. Although the supreme court recognized that a retailer
of canned goods could not inspect the food, it said, "We hold that
a retailer who sells unwholesome food for human consumption is
liable to the consumer for the consequences under an implied
warranty imposed by law as a matter of public policy, even
though the food is in sealed containers bearing the label of the
manufacturer and the retailer has no means of knowing that the
contents are unfit for human consumption." 6
Reasoning from these two decisions the court said that there
was no logical reason why the injured consumer could not pro-
ceed against the wholesaler. The court stressed the value of stare
decisis in a case of this kind and pointed out that this decision
was supported by the majority view in the United States.
On the second and final hearing, again a five-to-four decision,
the supreme court answered the certified question, "No". In a
vigorous reversal of the previous majority decision, the court held
that, in respect to implied warranty on packaged goods, the
injured consumer should be allowed to recover only against the
manufacturer of such packaged goods and not against the whole.
saler.
In answering the certified question, the court said that at the
time of the losey case, the majority common law view in the
United States was that the retailer of sealed goods was not liable
to the injured consumer. The majority view in the United States,
due to the Uniform Sales Act, was that the retailer should be
liable, but since Texas had not adopted the Uniform Sales Act,
the decisions of other states having this law were less persuasive.
Also, in following the majority view in the United States, which
is based on the Uniform Sales Act, the court on the original
hearing had indulged a "judicial" presumption that the consumer
relied upon the superior knowledge of the retailer, refusing to
make a distinction between packaged and open goods. In refuting
aId. at 634, 164 S.W. 2d at 840.
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this presumption the court said there was no superior knowledge
in fact. Due to the vast increase in the amount of goods that are
either canned or packaged, the retailer is seldom in a position
to inspect the food any better than the buyer. The whole idea of
implied warranty at common law was based on the fact that the
seller had superior knowledge concerning the goods he sold, and
that being in a better position to judge the goods than the buyer,
he should be held accountable for selling contaminated food. The
court concluded from this that the reason for the old rule ceasing,
a new rule should be applied. "... [T]here is no social desirabil-
ity in condemning an innocent party by manufacturing a warranty
based upon a 'superior knowledge' which can be shown does not
exist to escape criminal liability in this state."' The court thought
that procedural convenience was, in reality, the basis of the ma-
jority United States opinion, but that liability should not rest on
convenience.
The court spoke of an implied warranty imposed by law as a
matter of public policy. A warranty action is composed of the two
elements of tort and contract. The tort characteristic is one of mis-
representation by the seller to the the damage of the unknowing
buyer. The contract characteristic is that there is an implied
promise on the part of the seller not to injure the buyer. The main
difficulty in basing a warranty on a contract action in the instant
type of case is that there is no privity of contract between the
buyer and seller. The courts have confused these two elements of
liability and have simply implied a "warranty" as a matter of
law on a seller of edible goods. This "warranty" is interpreted
strictly, and negligence is not necessary as a basis for liability.
The actual decision of the court was to answer that a whole-
saler is not responsible for contaminated packaged goods that
pass through his hands. Also, the court's opinion may be said
implicitly to uphold the Capps case, which held the manufacturer
of contaminated goods liable to an injured consumer. As a result
7 251 S. W. 2d at 163.
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of these two decisions, the liability and non-liability of the manu-
facturer and wholesaler, respectively, are definitely established.
It appears that the liability of the retailer of contaminated
goods to the ultimate consumer is an open question in Texas today.
Although the cases holding the retailer liable were not expressly
overruled in this case, the majority emphatically criticized such
liability, and it seems doubtful that the previous cases will be
followed. However, in his separate concurring opinion in exon-
erating the wholesaler from liability, Justice Wilson said the
question of the retailer's liability was not before the court and
would not be considered at this time. Justice Wilson's opinion,
which was the deciding opinion in the case, is based on two
theories: lack of privity of contract between the wholesaler and
the purchaser, and the "innocent seller" doctrine, insulating the
wholesaler from liability.
It should be pointed out, however, that the concurring majority
stated that privity of contract was not to be considered. As to
Justice Wilson's second theory, further problems are to be con-
sidered and weighed. As between an innocent purchaser and an
innocent seller, who should bear the loss if the manufacturer is
insolvent? If convenience is to be considered, who can be more
easily reached by the injured party? Finally, should multipli-
citous litigation be encouraged, or should the plaintiff be allowed
to proceed directly against the party who has incurred liability
by his business operation?
Cooper Blankenship.
John Hamilton.
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